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Economic Integration Theories and the Developing 
Counties1 
Eduard Marinov1 
1International Economics Department, Economic Research Institute at BAS 
eddie.marinov@gmail.com 
Abstract. Economic integration theory goes through two development stages 
each of which addresses the relevant for its time political and economic context 
The first stage is regarded as classic theory or static analysis and includes the 
traditional theories of economic integration that explain the possible benefits of 
integration. The second stage includes the new economic integration theories 
that are often referred to as dynamic analysis of economic arrangements. Be-
sides these two, there is a third type of integration theories that deals with the 
effects, benefits and constrains of economic integration arrangements of devel-
oping and least developed countries. The current paper tries to come up with a 
conclusion on what parts of the classic and new integration theories are appli-
cable to integration arrangement among developing countries and to summarize 
these theories.  
Keywords: Economic Integration, Integration Theory, Developing 
Countries Integration   
1 Introduction  
Regional economic integration is one of the main trends in the development of inter-
national economic relations in the last few decades. There are multiple examples, 
practically everywhere in the world, which demonstrate that it is not an isolated event, 
but an actual global phenomenon. The opportunities that are presented by the different 
forms of economic integration arrangements are growing and so are the means and 
ways for their utilization.  
There is a clear distinction between the integration processes among developed 
countries where mainly the classic static and dynamic effects described by classic and 
new integration theory are sought, and those among developing and least developed 
countries – where the reasoning, the expected benefits and the clear constrains to the 
participation in integration arrangements are different. 
                                                          
1 This work was partially supported by the Project Grant BG051PO001-3.3.06-0053 of the 
European Social Fund and Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science under the contract 
No. DO 01 -4314/13.08.13. 
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Being a part of the theoretical chapter of my PhD thesis “Regional economic inte-
gration in Africa” the current paper is in its essence a survey of the literature on eco-
nomic integration theories. As such it does not have the ambition to be a complete 
research with historical data or to provide some concrete examples that the theory 
applied to developing countries seeks to determine, neither to present a to have a poli-
cy-oriented discussion. 
First, the paper explores the relevance of theories of static and dynamic analysis in 
the case of developing countries. It then discusses other economic integration theories 
that are adjusted to developing countries and are focused more on issues related to the 
effects, benefits and constraints of economic integration.  
The main contribution of the current paper is the systematisation of economic theo-
ries that could be applied to integration efforts among developing countries. 
2 Classic and new theories on economic integration effects  
Many authors claim that economic integration theory goes through two development 
stages each of which addresses the political and economic issues relevant for its time. 
The first stage includes the traditional theories of economic integration, which explain 
the possible benefits of integration and are often referred to as static analysis. The 
second stage includes the new economic integration theories, which are developed in 
changed economic conditions and trade environment – they are referred to as dynamic 
analysis of economic arrangements. 
Static analysis  
Research of trade integration and the explanation of theoretical issues related to pref-
erential trade agreements are based on the seminal book by Jakob Viner “The Cus-
toms Union Issue” (1951), which is often referred to as the first study of the benefits 
of economic integration that analyses them critically from an economic point of view 
(Catudal, 1951, p.210; Salera, 1951, p.84). 
Viner’s study is the first one to define specific criteria for the distinction of the 
pros and cons of economic integration. His so-called static analysis of economic inte-
gration distinguishes the now well-known effects of trade creation and trade diver-
sion. 
One speaks of trade creation when with signing a trade agreement between two 
countries trade is shifted from a higher cost producer to a lower cost producer among 
member-states. Trade diversion occurs when imports are shifted from a lower price 
producer from a third country, which is not a part of the integration agreement to a 
higher price producer from a member-state. This happens when a common customs 
tariff is applied if the integration agreement protects the higher cost supplier from a 
member-state. 
Viner claims that trade creation increases a country’s welfare while trade diversion 
reduces it. When speaking about the role of Customs unions on increasing economic 
welfare he says: “…customs union is only a partial, uncertain, and otherwise imper-
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fect mean of doing what a world-wide non-discriminatory reduction of trade barriers 
can do more fully, more certainly, and equitably…” (Viner, 1950, с. 135). What Vin-
er’s theory practically means is that countries would have motivation to participate in 
integration if it would possibly bring more benefits than costs, or, in other words – 
when integration leads to more trade creation than trade diversion. 
Many researches add on to Viner’s static analysis by addressing different issues of 
integration effects. All of them come to the conclusion that no one-sided answer could 
be given to the question of whether customs unions increase global welfare or not. As 
Meade says, “Our main conclusion must be that it is impossible to pass judgment 
upon customs union in general. They may or may not be instruments for leading to a 
more economic use of resources. It all depends upon the particular circumstances of 
the case” (Meade, 1955, с. 107). 
Dynamic analysis  
Even back in the 60’s, it becomes clear that static analysis of trade creation and trade 
diversion is not sufficient. Viner comes to the conclusion that an unpreferential trade 
policy (free trade) is a far better way to liberalise trade than a customs union, or, in 
other words the better allocation of resources is no longer applicable as a rationale for 
the creation of a customs union. Static effects analysis cannot fully assess the impact 
of integration on welfare, thus Bella Balassa introduces a new instrument to analyse 
the effects of economic integration on welfare – dynamic effects analysis – as a better 
means of explaining the reasons and economic rationale behind the creation of cus-
toms unions and economic integration schemes as a whole. A main thesis in interna-
tional economics is that free trade on competitive markets enables production and 
consumption efficiency globally as well as in every single country. At first, the crea-
tion of preferential trade agreements motivated by the ideas of static effects analysis is 
viewed as a shift towards free trade and thus is perceived as a tool to increase real 
income. However, this turns out not to be true – this type of analysis does not give 
simple answers and principles, thus the attention should be put on the dynamic analy-
sis of economic integration (Sheer, 1981, p.53).  
Balassa (Balassa, 1962) and Cooper and Massell (Cooper and Massell, 1965) are 
the first researchers that introduce the concept of the dynamic effects of economic 
integration, which adds a new dimension to the research in this area. Balassa defines 
the main dynamic effects of integration: “large-scale economies, technological 
change, as well as the impact of integration on market structure and competition, 
productivity growth, risk and uncertainty, and investment activity” (Balassa, 1961, 
p.117). Schiff and Winters summarise the definition of the dynamic effects of eco-
nomic integration as anything that affects the rate of medium and long term economic 
growth of the participating in the integration agreement member-states (Schiff and 
Winters, 1998, p.179).  
So far a number of recent studies (Sheer 1981; El-Agra 1988; De Melo and Pa-
nagariya 1993; Fernandez 1997; Lawrence 1997; Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfeld-
er 2003; UNCTAD 2007, p.54) have referred to the static effects and developments of 
the theory of economic integration (Viner and developments) as "old regionalism", 
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while "new regionalism" is represented by dynamic effects such as increased competi-
tion, investment flows, economies of scale, technology transfer, and improved 
productivity” (Hosny, 2013, p.139). Some researchers call the two theories “first and 
second” regionalism, while others seek the difference in the time frame in which the 
effects apply to the economies: “Short-term static effects are related to the initial shift 
in the behaviour of economic actors,… while long-term restructuring effects are relat-
ed to the improvement of the condition for the functioning of companies and their 
efficiency… and competition” (Panusheff, 2003, p. 37). 
New theories of economic integration are developed together with the change in 
global economic conditions. Lawrence (Lawrence, 1997, p.18) rightly claims that the 
driving forces behind  previous integration efforts (simple trade creation and trade 
diversion) are drastically different from the factors that stand behind recent integra-
tion development, such as private sector participation, foreign direct investment, an 
increasing role of services, etc. Together with these, among the main effects and fac-
tors that dynamic analysis regards as coming from the participation in integration 
agreements are, as follows: economies of scale (Corden,1972; Balassa and Stout-
jesdijk; etc.), economies of scope (Panusheff, 2003), investment creation and invest-
ment diversion (Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland,1995), increase of competition (Mari-
nov, 1999), etc. 
The only obvious setback of dynamic analysis is that, unlike the static one, there is 
no reliable method for quantitative assessment of dynamic effects. 
Dynamic analysis of the effects of economic integration comes from the character-
istics of today’s free economy. Because of their deeper scope dynamic effects have a 
larger impact on economic processes than static ones. The dynamic effects of eco-
nomic integration can be summarized as follows: increase of investment expenditure, 
sustainable increase of demand, consolidation of production and increase of its spe-
cialization, improvement of the organization and management of production and pro-
duction technology, rationalisation of territorial distribution and utilization of re-
sources, increase of production efficiency, creation of economic growth, etc. (Mari-
nov, 1999). 
3 Integration determinants in developing countries  
In most cases, theories of economic integration and its benefits – of dynamic ones, but 
even more of static ones, are not fully applicable to integration agreements among 
developing and least developed countries. Meier (Meier, 1960) claims that Viner’s 
analysis has limited or no relevance to integration among developing countries. Even 
Balassa (Balassa, 1965, p.16) claims that theoretical literature on economic integra-
tion issues discusses customs unions only in industrialised countries. Their problems 
and environment are not related to economic development, but more to relative 
changes of production and consumption features.  
The traditional theory of economic integration relies on many factors in order to 
reach the conclusion that net static effects determine the welfare effects of integration. 
Based on them, some generalisations can be made about the motivation of countries 
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to participate in integration processes. This part of the paper will try to distinguish 
those factors and effects of economic integration agreements that are relevant to de-
veloping countries. The economic determinants of integration agreements that influ-
ence the motivation of developing countries to participate in integration, in terms of 
both expected gains and feared negative consequences, are presented here in three 
main groups – general economic, market-related and trade-related factors and effects.  
General economic determinants 
Development perspective 
Many researchers claim that when it comes to developing countries, economic in-
tegration should be regarded an instrument for their economic development, and not 
that much as customs or even trade policy (Abdel Jaber, 1971; Balassa and Stout-
jesdijk, 1975). Integration theory is more focused on better resource allocation while 
development theory and policy deals more with the benefits from faster economic 
growth in the long term and the utilization of under- or not at all employed resources 
and production factors. Thus in many developing countries integration efforts are 
aimed at or more focused on the implementation of common projects in the field of 
development – poverty reduction, support for the development of healthcare and edu-
cation systems, achievement and preservation of regional security. 
Macroeconomic policy coordination 
Shams (Shams, 2003, p.9-10) claims that even if all trade prerequisites are fulfilled 
when an integration agreement among developing countries is signed, the divergence 
of their macroeconomic policies, combined with the lack of coordination among 
member-states, could reduce the potential gains of integration, especially regarding 
the increase of interregional trade. 
The issue of macroeconomic policy coordination dates back to the studies of 
Kahnert (Kahnert et al, 1969) and Hirschman, (Hirschman, 1971) who argue that in 
order for trade agreements to be durable, participating countries should try to uniform 
their internal monetary and foreign exchange policies (Hirschman, 1971, p. 22) and 
that this could be more important in promoting trade between the member countries 
than the customs preferences themselves. The economic areas that should be harmo-
nised are not only limited to macroeconomic policy, but could also include industrial, 
social, transport, environmental policies, etc. 
Size of the participating countries 
Traditional theory assumes that the larger (in economic terms) the participating 
countries are, the more substantial the benefits of integration will be. According to 
Abdel Jaber (Abdel Jaber, 1971, p.262) if the size of the economy is measured by the 
gross national product, integration benefits for developing countries are negligibly 
small. Balassa on the other hand claims that integration gains depend not only on the 
size of the countries participating in the integration arrangement, but also on their rate 
of economic growth. Thus, as developing economies tend to grow at higher rates than 
already developed ones, the benefits of integration for them would be even bigger 
(Balassa, 1961, p.38).  
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Another possible measurement of the size of the integration community is the 
number of population. Under this criterion, developing countries will surely benefit 
from integration as they are usually over populated (Hosny, 2013, p.144). 
Integration effects for small countries 
Kreinin claims that potential gains from economic integration can be observed 
more clearly in small and medium sized member-states (Kreinin, 1964, p.193-194). If 
integration (and trade as a whole) is carried out between a small and a large country, 
the benefits for the small one are bigger because there is more demand for its exports. 
This is very substantial when the small country is a developing one and the large 
country is a developed one, with higher purchasing power. 
A similar view is expressed by Velko Marinov, according to who in the environ-
ment of a bigger market, the comparative advantages of small national economies are 
manifested in their pure nature. They improve their production and market structure 
and increase their efficiency. “Positive effects of the participation of small countries 
in economic integration are achieved in medium and long term…, they assess the 
positive dynamic effects as far more substantial, which justifies the short term static 
losses” (Marinov, 1999, p. 110-111). 
The argument of the positive effect of integration on small countries has its oppo-
nents. Helleiner for instance claims that the disproportion of gains in favour of the 
larger country is inevitable and is a result of the disparity of the economic potential of 
the two countries. He argues that the small country is an unequal partner who is 
forced to adjust to the economic and price structure in the larger member-state (Hel-
leiner, C.K., 1996, as in Marinov, 1999, p. 112).  
Market-related determinants 
The welfare effects of economic integration among developing countries should not 
be limited only to those on production and consumption, but should also include the 
potential positive impact on employment, productivity, income level, specialization, 
competitiveness, etc.  
Employment and productivity effects 
It is established that in most developing countries exists a situation of generally 
low productivity plus mounting unemployment (Hosny, 2013, p. 141). Therefore 
when there is trade diversion that leads to labour force to be transferred from low-
productive sectors and activities to ones with higher value added, welfare will in-
crease. 
The integration benefits to employment are even more obvious (Sakamoto, 1969, 
p. 283). On one hand, they are related to the fact that the changes in the geographical 
distribution of production influence labour demand, and on the other hand the bigger 
flows of workers influences labour force supply (Longi and Nijkamp, 2007, p. 3), thus 
increasing employment possibilities and rates. 
Production specialization 
Developing countries in general are specialized in the production of primary prod-
ucts. According to Abdel Jaber (Abdel Jaber, 1971, p.256-257) there is nothing wrong 
with that as long as the economic surplus gained from this type of production could be 
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reallocated and invested efficiently in other sectors. That however is rarely what hap-
pens in reality, thus most developing countries adopt a trade policy of diversification 
and import substitution to accelerate economic growth. Balanced growth can be 
achieved by small developing countries by increasing the size of the market, benefit-
ing from economies of scale, and expanding their inter-industry transactions, i.e. 
through economic integration. For these effects to be achieved however, a strong 
commitment is required – both in economic and political terms.  
Protection for industrial development 
According to Viner, in some cases economic integration can be seen as a step to-
wards free trade, but in others it is one towards more protection (Viner, 1950, p.41-
49). There are some researchers who argue that protection trade regimes could be 
beneficial to developing countries. Cooper and Massell for instance believe that the 
main goal of integration agreements among developing countries is to support their 
industrial development (Cooper and Massell, 1965, p.462). This could be achieved 
through protection because integration, according to Sakamoto (Sakamoto, 1969, 
p.283-284), is equivalent to import substitution, which is a tool to support industrial 
development. Cooper and Massell come to the conclusion that when assessing the 
effects of a customs union on each member-state, one must take into account not only 
the change in national income, but also the development and size of each country’s 
industry sector (Cooper and Massell, 1965, p.468). 
If two developing countries create a customs union and there is a trade diversion in 
industrial products, welfare from the point of view of consumption, will increase 
when the tariffs are removed. On the other hand – from the point of view of produc-
tion – welfare will decrease (viewed as an effective use of resources) because it will 
be replaced with production in one of the developing member-states that is more inef-
fective compared to that of developed third-countries. However, if such trade diver-
sion is combined with a common external tariff that protects domestic industry, this 
could lead to the development of the industrial sector in both member-states. This 
would be particularly useful if the two developing countries are complementary, be-
cause this way each of them will expand their industrial production to supply the 
market in the other one (Cooper and Massell, 1965, p.475). 
According to Elkan (Elkan, 1975, p. 59 -68), however, it is likely for the benefits 
of integration in terms of industrial production in developing countries to be unevenly 
distributed among the member-states. He calls this effect "backwash" - where much 
of the economic benefits of integration are concentrated in one or a small number of 
member-states (Elkan, 1975, p. 58), while economically weaker and geographically 
distant countries attain less benefits compared to their partners in the community. 
International competitiveness 
In the past, developing countries have sought motivation for economic integration 
in the benefits from trade diversion and import-substituting industrialization. Later on, 
with the introduction of the ideas of the dynamic effects of integration, they began to 
find arguments for integration in the economies of scale, investment creation, tech-
nology transfer, etc. Nowadays, however, the integration initiatives of developing 
countries far exceed those arguments – most of them pursue policies of trade liberali-
zation and deregulation as part of their overall stabilization programs agreed with 
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international organizations. This approach has the goal to make economic integration 
policies compatible and complementary to other policies in order to promote interna-
tional competitiveness. Therefore, according to Hosni, most developing countries 
regard economic integration as a tool for more competitiveness in a global economy 
(Hosny, 2013, p. 143). 
Competition and complementarity  
Even Viner suggests that countries producing competing (similar) products gain 
more benefits from integration than those producing complementary (different) ones 
(Viner, 1950). This comes from the fact that the more significant the difference in the 
price of the same goods in the potential member-states is, the greater the benefit will 
be (Makower and Morton, 1961, p. 35). 
This should favour developing countries, because they specialize mainly in the ex-
port of products of the primary sector, thus competing in a Viner’s sense. Although 
this is true, the fact that the major part of their exports is directed to developed coun-
tries reduces the benefits of economic integration, because it actually does not in-
crease the volume of intraregional trade. The very category of the products of the 
primary sector is too large and, if split, one can see the potential benefits of integra-
tion (Abdel Jaber, 1971, p.261). Therefore Balassa argues that Viner’s understanding 
of the criteria for competitiveness and complementarity is not at all applicable to de-
veloping countries (Balassa, 1965, p.25). Their goal actually should be to achieve a 
significant degree of complementarity, thus increasing the volume of intraregional 
trade. 
More recent studies (e.g. Inotai, 1991) continue to support the thesis that in the 
cases of integration between developing countries complementarity and diversity of 
economic structures is better. In an integration agreement between similar (compet-
ing) countries, trade comes as a result of intra-sector specialization – trade expansion 
of this type is observed in the developed industrial countries where the size of the 
market and the income rate support specialization. However, this is obviously less 
likely for smaller and poorer markets such as those of developing countries, and 
therefore integration among heterogeneous (complimentary) countries is more benefi-
cial for them. 
Trade-related determinants 
Benefits of trade diversion  
Many researchers argue that trade diversion could actually be beneficial to devel-
oping countries. First of all, integration increases the size of the market and helps to 
reduce costs through economies of scale and space. Second, import substitution as-
sists the region as a whole to spend more foreign currency for the import of capital 
goods and thereby contributes to the increase of investment and economic growth 
(Linder, 1966; Sakamoto, 1969). Furthermore, trade diversion enables consumers to 
buy imported goods at lower prices after the removal of tariffs thereby increasing 
their savings. The effect of all these, however, must be weighed against the loss of 
tariff revenues (Elkan, 1975, p. 59), which is particularly important for developing 
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countries, since most of those countries rely on them as their main source of revenue 
in the budget. 
Linder and Sakamoto introduce the term "effective trade diversion". According to 
them, if economic integration among developing countries leads to trade diversion it 
should not reduce welfare because the production substitution will be from an effi-
cient developed country (outside the integration agreement) towards a relatively effi-
cient developing member-state, thus creating benefits in terms of employment and 
income within the community as well. 
Initial tariff levels 
Meade assumes that the higher the initial rates of tariffs between countries entering 
an integration agreement are, the higher the expected benefits of integration among 
them will be (Meade, 1955) –because the removal of the tariff will have a greater 
impact in terms of both welfare and intraregional trade. This is specifically important 
when it comes to developing countries because the national tariffs of most of them are 
rather high, mainly due to their desire either to increase revenue or to protect national 
production.  
International trade as share of GDP 
Lipsey assumes that the lower the share of international trade in GDP of the mem-
ber-states of an integration agreement is, the greater the expected benefits of a cus-
toms union on welfare will be (Lipsey, 1960, pp. 508-509). This is very important for 
developing countries because trade as a percentage of GDP in low-income countries 
has always been lower than in countries with a high level of income, although in re-
cent years this imbalance is decreasing (Hosny, 2013, pp. 144-145). However, the 
same does not apply to countries with medium levels of income and least developed 
countries – their share of trade in GDP is even more significant than that in high-
income countries. It can therefore be concluded that this criterion is not applicable to 
developing countries, because subgroups among them may have a larger or smaller 
share of trade of GDP compared with high-income countries. 
Share of intra-regional trade 
According to Lipsey an integration agreement will bring more benefits in terms of 
welfare if the share of intra-regional trade is growing, while trade with the rest of the 
world is decreasing (Lipsey, 1960, pp.508-509). Studies show that trade between 
developing countries is always much weaker than that between developed countries, 
suggesting that the benefits of integration regarding welfare will also be smaller. 
However, other researchers (Balassa, 1965; Abdel Jaber, 1971) believe that this as-
sumption should not always be taken for granted. They list several factors that restrict 
trade among developing countries, arguing that if these barriers are removed, trade 
flows between developing countries engaged in an integration process will likely 
increase. These factors include: first, the low level of economic development; second, 
inadequate transport infrastructure and facilities; third, foreign currency control and 
other restrictions on imports; fourth, inadequate marketing; fifth, the lack of standard-
ization. 
Fostering regional trade 
It is widely recognized that the best indicator of the success of an integration 
agreement is the increase of the share of intra- and inter-regional trade in the total 
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trade flows of member-states. Although this is an important aspect of integration Ino-
tai (Inotai, 1991, p.10) believes that it should not be seen as a means to its end. Equal-
ly important are the industrial development, the adequate infrastructure, the increase 
of the technological level, etc. Furthermore, the growth of regional trade may be the 
result of trade diversion from more efficient and competitive third countries. There-
fore it can be regarded as positive only if it is combined with improving global com-
petitiveness as a whole. 
Change of the trade structure with developed countries  
A major part of the imports from developed to developing countries consists of 
capital goods. From the dynamic analysis point of view, integration among develop-
ing countries requires substantial investments and since most of them are imported 
from developed countries in the form of capital goods it is likely that the volume of 
imports of integrating developing countries will grow. The conclusion of Mikesell is 
that the long-term goal of integration between developing countries should not be to 
reduce trade with the outside world, but rather to change in their trade structure 
(Mikesell, 1965, p.209). 
Sakamoto (Sakamoto, 1969, p.293) believes that if the result of integration among 
developing countries is the trade diversion of consumer goods, this will release more 
foreign currency for imports of capital goods from third (developed) countries. The 
volume of trade with the rest of the world may not change or may even increase, but 
the important thing is it changes its structure. 
Transport infrastructure 
Transport costs reduce the potential benefits of trade integration across countries. 
Distance itself affects the inter-sectorial trade. This is particularly important for de-
veloping countries that enter into integration agreements for two reasons: first, as 
countries with similar income per capita are more dependent on inter-sectorial trade. 
Second, transport infrastructure and facilities in developing countries are often in poor 
condition or even missing, or, if existing, they are designed to promote the transport 
of export of primary sector products the from developing to developed countries.  
Therefore, as Balassa argues, transport costs between two bordering developing 
countries may actually be higher than those between one of them and a remote devel-
oped country (Balassa, 1965, p.31). This must be taken into account when considering 
the integration of developing countries, thus according to Abdel Jaber (Abdel Jaber, 
1971, p. 262) in the preparation of integration agreements between developing coun-
tries one should pay special attention to the issue of existing transport facilities and 
infrastructure. 
Complex theories 
Static and dynamic approach 
According to many researchers, one must pay more attention to dynamic rather 
than to static effects when assessing integration processes among developing coun-
tries (Sakamoto, 1969; Abdel Jaber, 1971, etc.). Rueda-Junquera claims that tradition-
al integration theory, which analyses the static effects of resource allocation, implies 
rather small gains for developing countries and thus the motivation for participation in 
173
i
i
“llncsde2” — 2014/12/18 — 17:08 — page 174 — #172 i
i
i
i
i
i
integration agreements should be sought in the dynamic analysis of integration and 
the effects that it reveals (Rueda-Junquera, 2006, p.3-4). 
According to Abdel Jaber, traditional integration theory strongly relies on the neo-
classical assumptions for full employment, perfect competition, constant returns of 
scale and perfect mobility of production factors (Abdel Jaber, 1971, p.264-265). Thus, 
the analysis is restricted just to the static effects and the dynamic ones are those that 
could bring a higher economic growth rate and utilization of underemployed econom-
ic potential.  
The training ground theory 
Some of the issues discussed above – how to increase international competitive-
ness, what specialization to aim at, whether to use protection to support industrial 
development in integration agreements between developing countries – are thorough-
ly discussed in the training ground theory. According to Inotai, this theory rests on the 
hypothesis that through the first stages of integration among developing countries 
their international competitiveness could be gradually improved if they depend on the 
regional market in the first stage of industrialization (Inotai, 1991, p.6-7). Free trade 
among member-states, combined with high tariffs for third countries’ imports should 
give temporary protection to emerging industries as well as a market that is big 
enough to support the future industrial development. This process is referred to as 
“import substituting industrialization” (Rueda-Junquera, 2006, p.4) and gives enough 
time for the development of the industrial sectors of developing countries. The open-
ness to global markets could be realized on a later stage when developing countries 
have reached a certain degree of efficiency and technological development. Therefore 
economic integration among developing countries could be seen as a transition stage 
towards an open economy and competition with the rest of the world after a short 
period of training, thus the theory is called “training ground” theory. 
Although it looks sound from a theoretical perspective, there are some arguments 
against this theory. Inotai for instance (Inotai, 1991, p. 7) argues that first of all, de-
veloping regional markets in many cases are not big enough to enable industrial de-
velopment in the terms of economies of scale; second, as a result of the training pro-
cess there is rather small or even no improvement; third, there are great differences in 
demand preferences and tastes regarding the imports from third countries compared to 
those coming from interregional trade. Besides, there are no guarantees that develop-
ing countries would take on and fulfil the commitment to open up and liberalise their 
trade with the rest of the world at a certain point, thus protection measures could be-
come permanent instead of temporary. 
The package approach 
Another complex way to implement integration among developing countries is the 
package approach. According to Balassa and Stoutjesdijk, a package approach specif-
ically and explicitly aims at facilitating the integration process and enhancing the 
stability of an integration agreement by assuring that each member-state is responsible 
for the implementation of a single integration project within a common package of 
such projects (Balassa and Stoutjesdijk, 1975, p.53). These could include transport, 
communication, public goods, education, science, agriculture, mining, industry, etc. 
An important condition for the successful application of the package approach is that 
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comprehensive information regarding the distribution of benefits and costs of each 
project on each member country should be available so that there are no member-
states who feel there is inequality in the gains and expenses distribution of the integra-
tion process. Balassa and Stoutjesdijk argue that although this approach may seem 
plausible, problems such as financing, monitoring and controlling may arise.  
4 Conclusion  
From the above said, it is obvious that the rationale behind economic integration 
among developing countries could not be defined and explained just by the static and 
dynamic effects that determine integration between developed economies. With de-
veloping countries some factors have a stronger, while, controversially, others have a 
weaker impact on their willingness to participate in integration agreements.  
To assess the integration benefits and costs for developing countries one must take in-
to account their specifics such as stage of economic development, structure of the econ-
omy, production characteristics, demand preferences, trade regimes and policies, etc. 
Another thing that should be noted is that while in developed countries the main 
rationale for economic integration comes from economic groups of stakeholders, in 
developing countries integration processes often initially start as a political goal and 
effort, which in most cases leads to unsatisfactory economic results. The complexity 
of the political determinants of economic integration among developing countries and 
their interrelations with economic rationale will be subject to further research as will 
be the application of the theories presented to the real-world case of regional econom-
ic integration efforts in Africa.  
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